Wayne Rooney’s Tactics Analysed
Rooney seems set to usher in a return to a back four and Schuey-ball following the 3-4-3 renaissance under Ian Foster
In the weeks since Rooney’s announcement, fans have unsurprisingly been keen to know how Argyle will be set-up and what style of play to expect.
For such a big name who was well followed in each of his three football ventures, you’d expect that we’d already know the answer to that. Yet, Rooney has managed very little in England - fewer than two seasons worth of football in total.
Birmingham was short but not sweet, while his time at Derby came first as interim manager during the 2020/21 Covid season and then with a team heavily reliant on academy products.
Additionally, at both clubs Rooney was totally unable to shape a squad to match his managerial philosophy, while at DC he had limited opportunities to do so.
As a result, there’s some confusion about what Rooney’s style actually is. For example it’s been noted by multiple Argyle sites that “he likes to play with a big striker and looks for aerial dominance” when that doesn’t appear to be the case.
Rather, at DC United he inherited Christian Benteke as a star player and adjusted his tactics accordingly. On the contrary, Jay Stansfield was his preferred striker at Birmingham, who won just 12% of his headers last season.
That’s not to say we won’t see Argyle bring in a stronger striker this summer, just as Schuey attempted to sign Josh Coburn last season to replace Sam Cosgrove, but that his tactics aren’t based around aerial dominance.
Likewise, there has been contradictory information about whether Rooney likes his full-backs to invert or stay high and wide, as well as whether he wants to play out from the back or operate as a counter-attacking side.
Fortunately, although the stop-start nature of Rooney’s managerial career has made it harder to determine his philosophy, his national fame has resulted in multiple interviews during which he’s expanded on his preferred style of play.
Rooney’s footballing philosophy
Across three interviews in particular (pre-, during, and post-Birmingham) over the past 12 months, Rooney has been clear and consistent about how he wants his sides to play football.
His ideal formation is either a 4-3-3 or 4-2-3-1. That transitions into a 2-3-5 in possession, with the five made up of players positioned on the wing, plus two tens and a striker.
The centre-backs form the two, but every other position in the formation is fluid. For example, the full backs could push up high and wide, to take up positions on the wings, allowing the wingers to move inside into the half spaces.
Alternatively, a full back could invert, taking up a position in midfield to allow one of the midfielders to move into an advanced position and the corresponding winger to stay high and wide.
The front five are given the freedom to be creative, stretch the pitch, and rotate their positions to cause problems for the opposition and create chances. Meanwhile, the remaining five outfielders are tasked with providing balance and structure to the team. They’re asked to progress the ball up the pitch, maintain attacks by recycling or recovering possession, and guard the exposed team against counters when possession is lost.
Attacks are started from the back, with the goalkeeper and centre-backs expected to be comfortable in possession, as in this flowing move from back to front against Ipswich:
Out of possession, except when counter-pressing, the team is tasked with maintaining its shape in a 4-4-1-1 structure. In his own words, it’s not a high press. That means it’s not a Klopp-style ultra-pressing approach going man for man as high up as the opposition’s box.
Instead, he uses a pragmatic pressing approach, the kind most teams adopt, mostly triggered around the half-way line against the opposition’s midfield or full-backs.
When the press fails, the team falls into a compact shape around their area in that 4-4-1-1 structure.
If all of this is sounding familiar, it’s because it’s very similar to the approach that Schuey implemented in the first half of last season. After the Ian Foster aberration, it appears that Argyle are reverting to the tactics Dewsnip binned over Christmas.
There are differences, of course. Schuey’s system was a bit more structured, with the wingers tasked with staying high and wide consistently, while full-backs were asked to invert and form a box midfield when passing out from the back. Under Rooney, we’re more likely to see the wingers drifting inside and the full-backs providing the width.
Slick, attacking play
Nevertheless, like Schuey, the highlight of Rooney’s approach is undoubtedly his intent to score goals. At his prime, Rooney was one of the world’s ultimate attackers, and it’s clear he wants to bring that into the teams he manages.
You can see that in the way his teams have played. Whatever you think of his managerial career, his teams have scored some beautiful goals. Take this winner at Wednesday, a flowing move from back to front that sythed them open.
Or this move against Leicester, drawing in the press down one flank then switching the play to a winger in space. They get fortunate with the ricochet, but when you get five players around the opposition box then you tend to get luckier in attack.
Or this annoying third against Argyle back in December. Turning over possession on the edge of their own area with ten men, rather than rush a clearance they draw players in, beat the press, break away and score from a big chance.
Rooney wants his sides to get men forward, play with width and take risks. When he’s able to get his team playing this way they score goals as a result. Combined with a philosophy of passing out from the back and you get some outstanding goals, just like we saw from Argyle in the first half of last season. DC United’s best goals under Rooney is another reel of players sweeping forward, through the thirds, at speed.
All those best bits about the first half of last season? Those sublime goals, the fearless attacking, possession play? That’s what Rooney aims to bring, and was able to introduce in part at Birmingham. Yes, there weren’t enough goals, but there was huge progress made towards that style of football over the short period he was manager without the opportunity to bring any signings in.
Pragmatic pressing
When the opposition is building from the back, Rooney’s approach isn’t to start the press from the opposition’s eighteen-yard box. Instead, the team will allow their opponents possession in their third and tend to only engage once the ball reaches the middle third, just in front of the half-way line.
The press is triggered in two main ways. The first is by compressing the middle third and targeting the opposition’s midfield near the halfway line as they receive the ball when passing out from the back. We were unfortunate enough to witness to this at Home Park last season:
The second is by blocking passing lanes forward and forcing the ball wide towards a channel. The wide players are pinned against the touchline, either forcing a backwards pass or to attempt a risky pass or dribble to break the press.
You get a glimpse of this against Sheffield Wednesday. First Stansfield, then Bacuna, applied light pressure from an angle to force a pass square to the full-back. Once it goes wide, this triggers the press. With the touchline to their side and no easy pass available, they’re forced into a risky, 20-yard first-time pass inside to Bannan that’s close to being intercepted.
What this clip does reveal - and what you can see from other clips too - is that Birmingham didn’t perfect their pressing under Rooney. In this example, Miyoshi is too slow to react, enabling his man (#23) to make his pass. He should be triggered to press the moment the pass goes wide so he can block or intercept any attempted pass.
Likewise, Burke is slow to react and should be pressing with the unit to block and pass back inside, and Dembele should be tucking inside to cover Bacuna who’s stepped out of midfield to initiate the press.
Sides like Blackburn, Coventry and Leicester in particular were easily able to exploit the lack of cohesion in Birmingham’s pressing to create big chances. It was one of the principle reasons that Rooney failed. They committed numbers forward to try and win the ball back, but were too easily bypassed.
Ultimately, Rooney’s teams kept just three clean sheets in fifteen games, at two goals conceded per-game, only marginally worse than their xGA data. Many of these goals came from either breaking through Birmingham’s press, as seen above, or counter-attacking.
Threatened in transition
When you might have a full-back in midfield, another on the wing, a midfielder joining the front five, and nobody defending the flanks, how do you organise yourselves to defend against counter attacks? That’s a question Rooney was never really able to answer at Birmingham.
Too often they conceded from their own attacks, with no better example than this counter attack by Leicester. His team played wonderfully through the thirds to get to the edge of the box, with both full-backs up in support, only to see the ball rebound right back down the other end even quicker.
Stoke were another who were able to swiftly turn a Birmingham attack into a goal at the other end with remarkable ease.
Rooney’s main problem was he didn’t have the players to play that way. He needed athletic who could cover the ground and play a higher line, but that meant his preferred centre-back pairing, aged 22.5, lacked the leadership and communication skills required to coordinate the team. During transition. Some would press, others only half-heartedly, and the rest would hold position or drop deep. This created gaps to be exploited.
That lack of effective communication could be seen elsewhere too, like Bamford’s opener against Birmingham. Sanderson and Aiwu both point to each other delegating responsibility to mark to the other. In the end, neither does, granting him a free header at the back post.
Sweeper ‘keeper
Lastly, the elephant in the room (and a bit of comedic relief): John Ruddy.
Rooney was brought in to attempt this fearless brand of football, yet had to make do with Ruddy in goal.
As Ruddy himself has since admitted in an interview, he was not the right player for that style of play:
And he always looked uncomfortable being asked to play as a sweeper, too slow to get out of his box and often overcommitting at the wrong moments.
Once against Hull, twice against Leicester, and once again Blackburn he got into a horrible position against a counter attack allowing for an easy finish.
Rooney’s Argyle
What does that mean for Argyle? Well, first off, Rooney has Mike Cooper, the perfect goalkeeper for his preferred style of football. Even if he loses him, he’ll have the money to replace him if he doesn’t feel Hazard is ready yet to play that way.
More importantly, Rooney arrives at a club already well coached to play his style of football. This will make pre-season all the easier, as the foundations are already in place for him. That means there are no more excuses if he can’t implement his philosophy at Home Park. If he can’t do it now, then either his philosophy is flawed or he doesn’t have the skill to implement it.
It also means that the squad doesn’t need major surgery. There are areas where upgrades are needed, particularly a new right sided centre-back and midfield, but there are few players in the squad who won’t be able to adapt to Rooney’s approach.
A big question mark will be over Bali Mumba: does he become a fullback, given the demands for attacking output? Will he continue his transition into a winger, or could he end up back in midfield where he started out at Sunderland? He’s got the passing and vision, he just needs the discipline.
The key areas Rooney needs to focus on are those that tripped up Schuey: providing balance in defence to the ferocious attacking force that Argyle had become. For that, he might need to adjust his approach, which left too much space for their opponents.
Additionally, he needs to ensure his teams get greater control over games. Only once - against ultra-defensive Rotherham at home - did his Birmingham side complete over 350 passes. For context, when Argyle faced Rotherham at home, that total was over 550.
Retention of possession is not just a tool for scoring, it’s also a means of managing a game. Based on interviews, data, and previous matches, I don’t think Rooney sees it that way. This is an area in which I think he can evolve his approach to management.
Most importantly, he needs to ensure that Argyle add more experience in the right places. The side was too inexperienced last season, just like Birmingham, and that resulted in too many soft goals being conceded. Adding more quality and defensive leadership in the spine of the team must be a priority to avoid a repeat of the same issues that saw him sacked in January.